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Abstract
What are the long-term effects of modern warfare on public health? In 2001 U.S. Air
Force B-1 bombers dropped CBU-87 cluster bomb units on Afghanistan. Intended for terrorist
targets, these weapons failed to discriminate. In addition to reaching intended targets, they
also rained down upon the civilian population. The full extent of public health implications
remains undefined. Although the international community came together to ban the use of
cluster munitions in 2008, the United States Department of Defense maintains that cluster
munitions pose an insignificant risk to civilians and remain a legitimate and vitally important
weapon of war.

ii

Introduction
Cluster munitions are air delivered warheads, or dispensers, that release submunitions.
Designed to detonate upon impact, submunitions are alleged to provide a tactical advantage
through their wide-dispersal capabilities. Technically, cluster submunitions are not engineered
to be landmines, but, when they fail to detonate, they pose the same risks to civilians as other
unexploded ordnance, including landmines.1 Landmines have been used, albeit in rudimentary
terms, since the American Civil War. Cluster munitions warfare, however, first saw wide-range
use during the Vietnam War. 2 In October of 2001, United States Air Force B-1 bombers
dropped CBU-87 cluster bomb units throughout Afghanistan, enabling the infiltration of U.S. led coalition forces into hostile areas and simultaneously launching Operation Enduring
Freedom. The intent of the operation was to reduce terrorist threats to the United States
following the attacks on September 11, 2001.
Conflict is not new to Afghanistan. Civil war and foreign occupation have devastated the
country since 1978. By 2001 the Taliban, an extremist Islamic organization, controlled a
significant portion of Afghan national territory. Conflict, nonetheless, remained in the northern
and eastern regions. The start of Operation Enduring Freedom encompassed two parallel
actions: a ground war between the Taliban and a Northern Alliance supported by U.S. - led
coalition troops and an aerial war against the Taliban that utilized cluster munitions.3 Despite
the availability of advanced precision weapons, cluster munitions were the weapon of choice.
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While technology continues to produce lethal weapons, science has advanced public
health in every aspect imaginable. Robotic-assisted surgery is utilized in cancer treatment;
pharmacological compounds treat complex morbidities; and vaccines prevent epidemical
outbreaks. While advancements in science have dramatically decreased premature death,
alternative applications have perfected modern warfare. High tech weapons provide limitless
means to kill and maim. Whether conflict is remotely controlled or face-to-face, war continues
to affect the health and safety of civilian populations. 4
On October 7, 2001, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, via a Department of
Defense news release, announced the initial execution of Operation Enduring Freedom. As
described in the release, the operation’s objective was to “create conditions for sustained antiterrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan.” 5 Afghanistan was believed to be
the base of Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks against the United States. While there is much debate as to whether or not this
objective has been met, there remains a much larger issue to address. Operation Enduring
Freedom primary entailed urban warfare, by which civilians became unintended targets or
indirect victims of conflict. In the case of Operation Enduring Freedom, much like the civilian
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populations victimized by the Vietnam War, civilians continue to be affected post-conflict:
unexploded remnants of war continue to plague their daily lives.
Although the use of cluster munitions during Operation Enduring Freedom was not
publically acknowledged by U.S. officials until October 25, 2001, Human Rights Watch, one of
the world’s leading human rights organizations, reported that military sources confirmed their
use during the first days of the operation – in which Air Force B-1 bombers dropped fifty CBU87 cluster bombs over five sorties. Each CBU-87 contains 202 individual submunitions capable
of covering approximately 5,000 square meters. The initial campaign potentially blanketed
some ten square miles. The CBU-87s, formally known as Combined Effects Munitions, have an
anti-tank and anti-personnel effect in addition to incendiary capabilities. 6
Concurrently the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) reported on October 28, 2001,
that United States Psychological Operations (Psy-ops) radio had begun broadcasting a public
service announcement to Afghan civilians warning them not to “confuse the cylinder-shaped
bomb with the rectangular food bag” as both happened to be the same color: yellow. 7 In a
November 16, 2001 press release, Human Rights Watch reported that the U.S. Department of
Defense had indeed recognized the tragic implications of confusing these two objects and
announced that the color of the food packages would be changed. Yet, Human Rights Watch,
while acknowledging the proposed change, stressed that simply changing the color of the food
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packets, as the Department of Defense stated they would do, would not resolve the ongoing
threats that unexploded ordnance poses to non-combatant populations. 8
Lasting Repercussions
In order to classify the long-term repercussions of unexploded ordnance, it is necessary
to address the validity of cluster munitions by examining two parallel indicators: legitimacy and
civilian impact. The U.S. Department of Defense determines the legitimacy of a weapon by
weighing military gain against human suffering. 9 In other words, in order to be considered
unlawful, the suffering inflicted by a weapon must outweigh the legitimate military gain
achieved by its use. This official determination presents two questions for examination: Is
suffering quantifiable? What constitutes legitimate use?
Is Suffering Quantifiable?
In an attempt to quantify civilian suffering, clinical studies will serve as a basis to depict
the indirect and long-term consequences of war on public health. The first study reports injuries
and death from landmines and unexploded ordnance in Afghanistan from March 2001 through
June 2002, while the second study examines trends of injuries and death from January 2002
through December 2006. Alternately, the psychological impact of war will be considered by
examining mental health data. While these studies do not necessarily address cluster munitions
independently from other remnants of war, they depict quantifiable evidence of suffering. In
8
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addition to presenting a quantitative depiction, qualitative analysis will address the state of
Afghanistan’s public health infrastructure, as a means to describe completely the country’s
inability to respond to the health care needs of its citizens.
In 2003 the Journal of the American Medical Association reported on surveillance data
collected by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 390 health facilities
throughout Afghanistan.10 Oleg O. Bilukha, M.D., PhD, Muireann Brennan, M.D., MPH, and
Bradley A Woodruff, M.D., MPH, of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
analyzed data collected between March 2001 and June 2002 in order to understand the
epidemiological patterns and risk factors associated with landmines and unexploded ordnance.
Of the 905 health facilities the ICRC estimates to be functioning in Afghanistan, the study
incorporates data from the 390 facilities the ICRC identified as most likely to see injuries.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that health facilities can only accurately report
on individuals who present for care, and that many deaths and injuries go unreported for a
variety of reasons, which may include lack of transportation, non-access to a health facility, or
financial barriers. Additionally, individuals who die from their injuries prior to reaching a health
facility are also unlikely to be reported. Analysis is based upon 1,636 acutely injured
individuals, but does not address long-term physical disability or mental health concerns. Of
those injured, 81 percent were civilians, 91.6 percent were men and boys, and 45.9 percent
were under the age of sixteen.
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Children, rather than adults, were most likely to be injured by unexploded ordnance,
including grenades, bombs, mortar shells, and cluster munitions. Among children, 49 percent
were injured either playing or tending animals. The similarity between undetonated cluster
munitions and air-dropped food packages posed a specific concern, as children were more likely
to confuse the two. 11 Among the conclusions generated from the data, it was determined that
an increase in injuries resulting from cluster munitions began in October of 2001, but the study
does note that data collection was disrupted before and during coalition strikes.
In a second study, reported in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 2007,
Bilukha, Brennan, and Mark Anderson, M.D., MPH, of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, analyzed data collected from the ICRC between January 2002 and December
2006.12 The data was collected from 490 health facilities and from volunteers in a communitybased first aid program supported by the Afghan Red Crescent Society. Of the 5,471 individuals
injured or killed, similar to the previous study, approximately 91 percent were male, of which
47.2 percent were children under eighteen years of age. Of those injured, 17 percent, or 930,
died as a result of their injuries. The majority of children, 65.4 percent, suffered injuries as a
result of unexploded ordnance. Overall, the proportion of injuries resulting from unexploded
ordnance increased from 48.4 percent in 2002 to 58.8 percent in 2006. According to the study,
these totals account for 70.6 percent of all injuries in children and 41.9 percent in adults in
2006.
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While taking into account their limitations, these two studies indicate the prevalence of
injuries on communities directly affected by conflict. Unexploded ordnance continues to
impede the daily lives of civilians five years after the initial coalition strikes. Yet, absent from
these two studies is the inclusion of mental health data, which when viewed in conjunction
with physical injuries, depict the psychological impact of war. According to Afghanistan’s first
national Human Development Report, February 21, 2005, the World Health Organization
estimated that 95 percent of Afghanistan’s population has been affected psychologically as a
result of war. One in five individuals suffers some type of mental health condition, including
anxiety, depression, insomnia, and post-traumatic stress disorder, yet mental health services
remain desperately lacking from the current health care system.13
Willem Scholte, M.D., of the Academic Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry,
University of Amsterdam, examined, in coordination with fellow colleagues, mental health
conditions among ethnic Pashtuns residing in Afghanistan’s eastern province of Nangarhar
during January and March 2003.14 Their objective was to determine the rate of exposure to
traumatic events within a ten year time period and assess present coverage of basic health
needs. Their findings suggest that mental health symptoms are present in the local population
and should therefore be addressed at the primary care level. Of the 1,011 survey respondents,
age fifteen and older, 43.7 percent had experienced between eight and ten traumatic events
within the preceding ten years. Basic medical care was deemed insufficient; 22.6 percent of
13
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those surveyed indicated that access was indeed a problem. High rates of depression were
reported by 38.5 percent of the participants, and included symptoms of anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder.
Afghanistan’s public health infrastructure indicates an ill-functioning and highly
understaffed system that relies, in part, on services implemented and administered by the ICRC.
It is therefore necessary to illustrate, in a limited scope, some of the health care challenges
Afghanistan faces in order to provide a contextual framework with which to understand the
burden explosive remnants of war place on an already insufficient system. As trained medical
professionals provide the backbone to any normal functioning health care system, the absence
of physicians in Afghanistan no doubt hinders the country’s progress.
Afghanistan’s National Human Development Report indicated that in 2004 only 210
facilities are equipped with beds to hospitalize patients, which equals 0.32 beds per 1,000
people. An even greater disparity exists when accounting for location, as existing infrastructure
favors urban areas and does not address the needs of 75 percent of Afghanistan’s rural
population.15 In comparison, the United States averaged 3.2 beds per 1,000 people in 2006. 16
In 2005, The Lancet, the world’s leading general medical journal, reported that logistical
concerns hamper the return of expatriate health professionals, many of whom reside in the
United States. Those that have returned continue to face financial roadblocks. Although they
self-fund pharmaceuticals and the medical supplies necessary for treatment, these physicians’
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salaries go unpaid, The Lancet reported. Continued training poses a parallel challenge, as
returning physicians found the medical school at Kabul University destroyed. 17
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health, unequipped to handle the continued care of
individuals injured by landmines and other remnants of war, relies on the Ali Abad Orthopedic
Center in Kabul, a rehabilitation facility operated by the ICRC. In addition to physiotherapy,
which treats disease through physical exercise and massage, the center manufactures custommade prostheses and durable medical equipment that includes leg braces, crutches, and
wheelchairs. The Kabul center is one of six International Committee of the Red Cross
orthopedic centers in Afghanistan, which, for the last two decades, have provided disabled
Afghans with orthopedic care. 18 It is dramatically evident that the toll on public health during
this conflict is significant and quantifiable.
What Constitutes Legitimate Use?
The basis for legitimacy rests on detonation standards and strategic scrutiny. In order to
adequately determine legitimacy, recognition has foremost been placed on military strategy.
According to Air Force Major Thomas J. Herthel, cluster munitions provide an effective delivery
method for operations requiring wide-dispersal and are no different from other fragmentation
weapons that are designed to inflict damage. 19 In order to understand the full extent of their
use, it is necessary to define the tactical advantage they serve. In June 2008, U.S. Secretary of
17
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Defense Robert M. Gates noted that cluster munitions are used to engage targets that include
“massed formations of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a defined area, targets
whose precise locations are unknown, and time-sensitive or moving targets.” 20 While these
tactics may have been well suited to pre-Cold War conflicts, they do not translate well to
modern warfare. Secretary Gates’ memorandum merely evokes blanket policy in order to
legitimatize the use of an unreliable and ineffective weapon. It is unfathomable that the U.S. Air
Force, that can remotely operate unmanned planes in Afghanistan from a computer console in
Arizona, continues to insist that cluster munitions are a reliable method of targeting enemies
whose locations are unknown. 21
While the Defense Department insists that there remains an operational need for such a
weapon, it is necessary to examine and validate the weapon’s effectiveness. The Defense
Department claims that cluster munitions serve, in certain circumstances, as an effective
weapon. In their absence, unitary bombs may inflict more direct damage and result in greater
initial civilian casualties. To illustrate this rationale, James F. Lawrence, director of the Office of
Weapons Removal and Abatement of the State Department, uses the example of a simple
antenna. A roof antenna, he contends, could effectively be taken out by a cluster bomb without
destroying the entire building. 22 Perhaps a single cluster submunition would prove to be more
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effective than a unitary bomb in removing a roof antenna. It is important, however, not to
discount the damage inflicted by the additional 201 submunitions that are released
simultaneously. What are the direct and indirect costs of removing that single antenna? Of
those 202 submunitions, how many failed to detonate? Can the success of removing a single
antenna be justified at the expense of an entire neighborhood, which would no doubt suffer
human and structural casualties?
Detonation Standards
Even when properly deployed, ammunition rarely performs at the success rate that is
calculated during controlled testing. Ammunition trials often depict an inaccurate accounting of
how munitions will perform in the field.23 To place detonation standards in a historical context
it is necessary to examine, in a limited scope, the use of cluster munitions during the Vietnam
and Persian Gulf Wars. On March 3, 1966, an ammunition test was conducted at Nellis Air Force
Base in Nevada. It provides incredible insight into documented failure rates:
In a controlled situation a F-4c released the bomb [a CBU-24/B containing
BLU-26 bomblets] in a 45-degree dive at an altitude of 5,500 feet with a
5-second fuse set to function the release of the bomblets at an altitude of
1,908 feet; 663 bomblets were spread over an impact area
measuring 900 x 400 feet -173 of them failed to explode. A failure rate of
more than 26 percent. 24
This test was conducted under controlled conditions on U.S. soil; battlefield conditions certainly
impact the operational ability of cluster munitions to an even greater negative extent. Despite
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technical advancements that undoubtedly occurred between 1966 and 1991, a 2002 report by
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) illustrates the documented failures of
submunitions during the Persian Gulf War:
An explosive ordnance disposal commander estimated that an area
occupied by the 24th Infantry Division during the war experienced at least
a 15- to 20-percent dud rate for some Army submunitions….‘‘an unknown
amount was covered by sand suggesting an even higher rate.’’ 25
Air Force submunitions were estimated to have a 40 percent dud rate in one area, in which
explosive ordnance disposal personnel concurred that sand hindered their detonation
capabilities. Controlled testing in 1990 further implicates the extent of failure of Defense
Department methods. The test identified two lots of artillery-delivered non-landmine
submunitions that had duds in excess of 40 percent. Testing documentation, by the GAO,
indicated that “one way to compensate for this high dud rate is to increase the quantity fired”
with instructions to “‘make adjustments in the tactical employment plans.’” 26
Despite documented failure rates during the Persian Gulf War, in which detonation rates
were exacerbated by sandy conditions, the Defense Department chose to use cluster munitions
in Afghanistan – a country composed of desert and mountainous terrain. In 2003 the journal
Military Medicine reported that nine cluster bomb sites were assessed in Afghanistan’s Shomali
Valley after Operation Enduring Freedom. The assessment concluded that submunitions

25
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experienced a 17.4 percent failure rate, as 317 of the 1,818 cluster submunitions deployed had
failed to explode. Of these 317, 33.7 percent had become buried in the ground. 27
Controlled testing, illustrated by these examples, is not a reliable means upon which to
base safety standards, as ammunition trials cannot adequately predict field conditions. The
Defense Science Board, a federal advisory committee commissioned by the U.S. Department of
Defense, concurred in September 2005 when it reported that surveillance testing - normally
conducted under ideal conditions - results in “an incomplete statistical image of a given
munition’s reliability.” 28 Deployment in controlled and battlefield conditions both generate
variable results which in turn produce inadequate predictability standards. Although controlled
testing rates have significantly improved since 1966 - documented in 2004 to be between 1 and
6 percent - failure rates outside of controlled testing environments continue to be documented
at between 15 and 20 percent.29 Yet, according to the Defense Science Board’s study, there is
no comprehensive approach “to determine and document operational combat failure rates of
US munitions,” as the available data is “inconsistent, largely anecdotal, and often from
questionable sources.” 30
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Department of Defense Policy
On December 3, 2008 ninety-four countries, including Afghanistan, signed the
Convention on Cluster Munitions treaty that bars signatories from using, producing, selling or
stockpiling cluster munitions. 31 Defense Department documents provide contextual evidence of
the evolution of U.S. policy that supports continued legitimacy of cluster munitions use and
non-signage of the treaty. In light of the ban on cluster munitions proposed during the Oslo
Process in Dublin, Ireland in June of 2008, the Department of Defense released what they
contended to be a viable alternative. 32
To reinforce the legitimacy of their use, Gates emphasized their distinct advantages and
stressed that “cluster munitions are an integral part of U.S. forces capabilities” of which the loss
would “require an increase in other resources.” 33 The DoD’s viable alternative to the treaty,
therefore, is the adoption of policy to take effect in 2018, in which military departments and
combat commands will only deploy cluster submunitions that maintain a 99 percent detonation
rate. While a 1 percent failure rate is an ambitious standard to maintain, there are no feasible
means by which to ensure that a 1 percent failure rate in a controlled environment will result in
an equivalent standard during unpredictable and inconsistent battlefield conditions. Nor is
there a practical way to accurately document unexploded ordnance once it has been deployed.
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Earlier in 2008, the Department of State, in a White Paper issued by the Bureau of
Political-Military affairs, contended that cluster munitions, when compared to other explosive
remnants of war, only “constitute a small portion of the total humanitarian threat presented by
unexploded aerial bombs, unexploded artillery shells, and other conventional unexploded
munitions.” While the State Department discredits the humanitarian impact of cluster
munitions and candidly states that the “long-term impacts of other munitions have been
ignored or under reported” as a result of their publicity, is emphasizes that the United States
continues to assist Afghanistan in clearing all explosive remnants of war. 34
The State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement shares this view. In
June 2007 Director Richard Kidd stated that, although cluster munitions are considered a postconflict threat, the threat is “episodic, [and] manageable within current response
mechanisms.” 35 Furthermore, Katherine Baker, a member of the U.S. delegation to the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons - Group of Governmental Experts, stated in
January 2008 that explosive remnants of war, including those from unexploded cluster
munitions, are fully covered under Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons. 36 In doing so, Baker reinforces the Defense Department’s position that additional
provisions, focused solely on one type of war remnant, are unnecessary. Protocol V addresses
34
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post-conflict humanitarian concerns, such as removal and civilian notification. While it correctly
diagnoses the human impact, Protocol V merely attempts to alleviate, not prevent the
symptoms. 37
Modifications & Advancements
Despite documented claims that cluster munitions are an effective weapon, the Defense
Department continues to fund contracts intended to improve their reliability. Defense Industry
Daily reported in 2005 that the DoD granted a 52.9 million dollar contract to Lockheed Martin
Missile and Fire Control. The order was for 1,655 Production Phase Wind Corrected Munitions
Dispenser (WCMD) Tail Kits. The relatively inexpensive tail kit, costing taxpayers a mere $9,000
per unit, allegedly “turns ‘dumb’ cluster bombs into accurate ‘smart’ weapons” by steering
deployed cluster dispensers to precise target coordinates. While the dispenser itself was
capable of accuracy within 30 feet, the submunitions contained within it no doubt seriously
damaged everything within their range; hence making the tail kit, and the dispenser’s 30 foot
accuracy, irrelevant. 38
Weapons manufacturers continue to utilize advancements in technology to further U.S.
military superiority. Textron Defense Systems, located in Wilmington, Massachusetts, designed
and manufactured the CBU-105 which was combat dropped during Operation Iraqi Freedom in
April 2003. Known as a Sensor Fuzed Weapon, the CBU-105 was the first “smart” air-to-surface
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cluster munition to be produced for the U.S. Air Force. In production today is the BLU-108,
which is equipped with passive infrared and active laser sensors.39 While a sensor is capable of
detecting and engaging a target, it is important to bear in mind that a sensor cannot distinguish
between civilian and combatant.
Engineering a “safe” weapon would inherently contradict the nature of war. In light of
this, what feasible options are available to guard against civilian harm? From a humanitarian
aspect, any weapon that does not have the ability to discriminate threatens civilian welfare,
both during - and in the case of cluster munitions - after conflict. Cluster munitions, from a
strategic standpoint, are argued to be, in certain circumstances, an effective weapon. In remote
rural locales the use of cluster munitions could be justified, yet it is quite evident that their use
in urban areas poses undue harm to civilian populations.
The United States is at the forefront of advanced weapon capabilities. Despite
advancements in science, war at its most basic level continues to consist of conflict between
human beings. The ability to engage in conflict remotely, whether it be from an Air Force
bomber miles above a city or from a computer console in the United States, does little to
protect civilian populations. Modifications and advancements may attempt to reduce civilian
impact, yet they cannot ensure civilian safety when urban warfare occurs.
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Conclusions & Recommendations
On February 11, 2009, a bill was introduced into the United States Senate by Senator
Diane Feinstein (D) of California, titled the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2009.40
The bill, if passed, supports previously stated U.S. Defense Department policy, which limits
submunitions to those that do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance. It
moves beyond current policy to state that these munitions will not be used in civilian areas. The
bill’s inclusion of a presidential waiver in regards to submunition failure rates, however,
conveys the Defense Department’s intent to maintain, and continue utilization of, the same
type of munitions deployed during Operation Enduring Freedom.
The United States has the capacity to persuade without force, yet it continues to dictate
with military strength. Advancements in science continue to refine U.S. military strategic

capabilities. The cluster munitions utilized during Operation Enduring Freedom only offer a
glimpse into future weapons capabilities. The United States Air Force, for instance, is seeking to
develop submunitions that would “be equipped with sensors capable of locking on to targets up
to 5 kilometers away, and should have enough onboard power to chase a moving target for up
to 5 minutes.” 41 Reality dictates that advancements in science will continue to produce
weapons that fall outside of current international treaties.
Military warfare doctrine does not always discriminate between soldier and civilian.
Urban warfare, henceforth, provides no realistic means upon which to shield civilian
40
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populations from harm. The use of cluster munitions during Operation Enduring Freedom is, in
and of itself a singular event, yet within the scope of public health it remains an issue of global
significance. Historical analysis indicates that it is an operationally unsound weapon;
chronologically documented since the Vietnam War. Within Afghanistan, unexploded ordnance
places undue burden on an already fragile society, which has endured three decades of modern
conflict.
Urban warfare affects civilian populations, unintended or not. As health is the catalyst of
a productive and functional society, public health is the foundation upon which civil society
exists. Explosive remnants of war continue to burden public services and chronically affect
those who have already suffered as a result of it. It poses a generational threat to those who
remain to carry on their lives long after violence ceases. Beyond immediate assistance to the
wounded, long-term infrastructure development must adequately address civilian needs, as
public health is not simply limited to the availability of a medical professional, but also
encompasses the notions of welfare and wellbeing.
Why does the Defense Department cling to an operationally unsound weapon? Its
reasoning remains stagnated in Cold War tactics, despite operating a 21st century war. Until the
United States can pursue and ensure national security through non-conflict avenues, there will
remain an operational need for defensive and offensive weapons. The goal, therefore, is to
continue to refine and perfect the rules of engagement while simultaneously placing value on
human welfare. The international community has deemed cluster munitions to be contrary to
this standard.
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The intent of public health is to first prevent, and then to cure. 42 U.S. policy needs to
shift focus away from post-conflict remedies to prevention. Ongoing discussion and analysis will
continue to provide a basis upon which to measure the full extent of public health implications
in Afghanistan, as subsequent clinical studies and the declassification of military warfare
doctrine will no doubt provide further insight into the long-term consequences of Operation
Enduring Freedom.
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